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The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation
in1976
By Walter J. Blum*

In turning again to a consideration of the case
for progressive taxation in our society, the most
important development since publication of The
Uneasy Case for Progressive TaxationI in the early

fifties has been the emergence of a more or less
general consensus that the state is to assure
nearly everyone the resources for some
minimum standard of life. The question now to
be explored is whether implementation of this
aspect of the welfare state serves to strengthen
the argument for distributing the tax burden on
a progressive basis.
I
At the outset it is once again important to
clarify the usage of the term "progressive taxation." The reference in this discussion is to the
total system and not to any particular tax. Progression in essence concerns the relationship between the distribution of the aggregate burden
among taxpayers and the distribution of what
might be thought of as their taxable capacity.
The relative capacities of taxpayers can plausibly be derived by comparing incomes or expenditures or wealth. In our society, progressivity
usually is described and measured against a
background of income. For the discussion
ahead it is sufficient to label as "progressive" any
system that takes in taxes a relatively larger
*Wilson-Dickinson Professorof Law.
1. Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case
for ProgressiveTaxation. University of Chicago Press (1953).
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share of income from the more affluent than
from the less affluent.
Admittedly this is said very quickly. Wide differences of view exist as to the most appropriate
concept of income for comparing taxpayers.
There are, in addition, troublesome questions
whether the proper unit of comparison is the
individual, the marital union, the household or
something else; whether the proper period of
income measurement is a single year or a longer
time; and whether all taxes in fact can be adequately weighed against an income base. It is
particularly difficult to translate wealth transfer
taxes, such as those imposed on gifts and estates,
into levies scaled against income. Finally, the
definition of progression must take account of
the likelihood that the incidence of a particular
tax differs significantly from one taxpayer to
another through the operation of market
forces. Despite these difficulties, it is useful and
convenient to talk about the whole system as
though it consisted of only an income tax that is
not shifted from those who bear the burden directly or through attribution.
An additional oversimplification needs to be
introduced in order to make the inquiry more
manageable. There are many possible patterns
for a progressive tax on income. One polar pattern consists of levying no tax on the poor
-meaning those whose incomes are below the
minimum level fixed by legislation-and assessing all other taxpayers at a flat rate on any income in excess of that level. In essence this arrangement, known technically as a "degressive"
tax, utilizes two rates. The exempted income
-that below the minimum level-is taxed at a
zero rate while all income over and above the
exempted amount is taxed at a uniform positive
rate. The zero rate for exempted income results
in a progressive tax among those whose incomes
exceed the exemption. This comes about because the larger one's total income, the greater
the fraction of it that is subject to the positive
rate of tax and the smaller the fraction that is
subject to the zero rate. As income increases, the
4

effective rate of tax on that income approaches
(but never quite reaches) the uniform positive
rate of tax.
The other polar pattern is a "very high" tax
on the incomes of the affluent, a "substantial"
(but not "heavy") tax on the middle class, and no
tax on the poor. This may be called "steep progression." A middle pattern can loosely be described as consisting of a "high" (but not "very
high") tax on the affluent, a "heavy" (but not
"high") tax on the middle class, and no tax on
the poor. This may be called "moderate progression". For purposes of analysis the arguments over progressive taxation to a large degree can be reduced to arguments over versions
of these three arrangements.
All three of the basic patterns of progression
are of course in contrast to proportionate taxation. Under such a plan every taxpayer, regardless of total income, pays in tax the same percentage of that income. In an earlier era, before
there was general agreement that the government is to underwrite a minimum standard of
living for nearly everyone, it was quite common
to argue in favor of proportion as a principle.
But after the new welfare consensus had been
implemented, the strict proportion principle
became hard to defend. The combination of a
commitment to a minimum standard of living
plus strict proportion in taxation would put the
state in the awkward position of simultaneously
taxing the poor and providing them with greater support benefits to offset the collection of
those taxes. In the regime of a welfare state, the
realistic version of proportionate taxation is the
degressive pattern of progression-that which
calls for exempting the poor and taxing all income above the minimum level at one rate. The
more lively question, then, concerns the choice
to be made among the three basic patterns of
progression.
The question can be probed by focusing on
the minimum support commitment to the poor.
It might be asked: Should the resources made
available to the poor be obtained by resorting to
5

steep progression that imposes the taxes on high
incomes, or by spreading the burden proportionately on all incomes in excess of the
minimum level, or by adopting moderate
progression-a position that lies near the middle of these two poles? Conferring support
benefits on the poor by itself acts to reduce the
economic inequality between those who are
below the minimum line and all other persons in
the society. The narrower question for tax policy concerns the extent to which the financing of
these benefits should be utilized as an occasion
for altering the distribution of incomes over and
above the minimum level.
This statement of the tax issue has the virtue
of confronting a recent proposal that has attracted considerable attention.' The suggested
program calls for putting a floor under support
benefits so that virtually everyone will have an
income (in kind or in dollars) not less than half
the median income in the society and for covering the full cost of all these incremental benefits
solely by increasing the taxes payable on high
incomes. The plan would accomplish two
things. It would transfer resources from the
group above to the group below the "poverty
line" as legislatively defined-a matter of gross
redistribution policy which is outside the scope
of this inquiry. And it would reduce the
economic position of the affluent vis-a-vis
everyone lower on the economic ladder, making
the tax system more steeply progressive. This
latter aspect of the plan highlights the central
question to be explored: How should the cost of
all support benefits to the poor be distributed
among the non-poor?
In addressing the issue, it is useful and not
wholly unrealistic to assume that the total tax
burden in society is increased by the cost of
these support benefits. It is also instructive to
assume that such costs can be separated from
the cost of all other functions undertaken by
government.
2. Arthur M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big
Tradeoff. The Brookings Institution (1975).
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II
There are several lines of argument for concentrating on the affluent the burden of underwriting the economic position of the poor. Some
have been put forward explicitly; others can
only be surmised from rather general positions.
A considerable degree of overlap in stating
them seems inevitable. What follows is a best
effort to capture and then examine the various
points that can be offered in behalf of the steep
progression position.
(1) General agreement on a proper criterion
for setting a minimum standard of living to be
underwritten by the government can never be
reached. Of necessity the line must reflect a
wide-ranging political compromise. Under
these conditions it is unseemly for the government to force the transfer of a dollar from a
taxpayer not far above the line to persons
somewhere below the line. Such an undesirable
consequence can be avoided, it is contended, by
placing the tax burden squarely on the affluent
instead of spreading it more nearly in proportion to income among all those who are not in
poverty.
Although arresting, this argument is hardly
distinctive to support for the poor. Every category of government spending reflects a political
compromise; no area is or can be controlled by
an external standard. In this respect the case for
steep progressive taxation is not advanced by
emphasizing the welfare nature of expenditures
associated with the collection of taxes.
(2) Adequate support benefits for the poor
will not be legislated if a proportionate part or
substantial part of the corresponding tax burden is put upon the middle class, particularly
the lower end of the middle class. This contention is the political realism counterpart of the
previous point. The reality, so the argument
runs, is that there will be adequate support for
the poor only if the cost is placed in a notably
disproportionate manner on the affluent.
This relationship cannot be established by citation to history. But even if it were well7

grounded in experience, the point would not
help in formulating a sound tax policy. Suppose
that the middle class did resist raising the support level for the poor because of objections to
paying higher taxes for this purpose. The existence of such a situation would instruct us more
on the subject of designing the welfare program
than on the question of a proper tax policy. It
most directly would put into issue the kind of
consensus which, in our society, is best for deciding on the contours of the basic support program. Any bearing on tax policy is of a negative
sort: the notion seems to be that in focusing on
tax policy, our vision should be intentionally
blurred in order to escape facing the hard problem of drawing the critical support line in dealing with the poor.
(3)A causal connection exists between the fact
that there are both the poor and the affluent in
our society. Affluence, according to the most
simplistic form of the argument, somehow rests
on impoverishing others who are less skillful or
fortunate. It is, therefore, only right that the
affluent should be charged with the cost of
maintaining the poor at a minimum standard of
living.
Such an argument is not easily answered because it is so lacking in specificity and reasoning.
Perhaps it is intended to play on the guilt of the
non-poor; perhaps it is designed to be mere
rhetoric that might touch sensitive emotions.
But both economic analysis and common observation indicate that in our society (at least since
the abolition of slavery) the affluent do not have
the economic power or means or motivation to
prevent individuals from rising above poverty.
A satisfactory explanation of the survival of
poverty is bound to be complicated, taking account of factors as diverse as natural disadvantages, family attitudes and composition, personal misfortune, and misguided laws. Understanding of the situation is not helped by blaming poverty on an economic conspiracy among
the affluent. Indeed, the relationship between
poverty and riches generally runs in the other
8

direction: most affluence is based on economic
activity that raised the economic level of the society and on average benefitted its members.
(4) The affluent, by using their wealth to exercise a disproportionate share of political
power, prevent the passage of legislation that
would reduce (if not eradicate) poverty. The
crux of the contention is that the affluent "corrupt" the democratic political process and exert
too much influence over the course of governmental events. It is impractical to police their
activities directly because the "misuse" of wealth
is not easily detected. Reducing the resources
available to the affluent, reformers urge, will
tend to redress the political "imbalance" and
improve the position of those at the bottom of
the economic scale.
This point in some respects parallels the notion that affluence rests on economic repression
of the poor. The poor under this account are
impoverished because the affluent turn their
wealth into political force that works against
programs for uplifting those who are handicapped in the economic race. Thus it is said that
the political reach of the affluent holds down
public spending on such matters as general education, health maintenance and job training-all
of which presumably would tend to alleviate
poverty.
It is by no means clear that the affluent in fact
have predominated in opposing increased public spending in these areas. There is considerable evidence suggesting that on balance the
middle class has been most cautious about
moves to initiate or expand a variety of programs that require new expenditures by government. While the cynic might attribute this
reaction to propaganda engineered by the
affluent, an explanation that does not denigrate
the intelligence of a broad spectrum of society is
more plausible. Government programs often
tend to start small and then grow vastly in size.
As expenditures by government increase, the
resources possessed by the affluent are simply
not large enough to offset the cost. Members of
9

the middle class can readily recognize that eventually they will have to bear a large share of the
taxes needed to cover the cost of programs
being proposed.
Moreover, the argument that affluence "distorts" the distribution of political power is not
strengthened by an undertaking to provide
nearly everyone with a minimum level of resources. Whatever force the point may carry
-and it seems to have relatively little thrust in a
broadly open society in which political power
can be traced to sources as diverse as personal
charisma, intelligence, skill at organizing people, and sheer energy-the political position of
the affluent would seem to be smaller rather
than greater once a commitment to the poor has
been instituted. It is possible to argue that without a support floor the presence of the poor
would constitute a higher threat of revolution
and that a support program, by diminishing
that threat, augments the political power of the
affluent. Such reasoning, however, borders on
being perverse. Is it reasonable to think that the
relative tax burden placed on the affluent
should be increased because the economic condition of the poor has improved?
These various arguments, taken singularly or
in combination, fall far short of showing that the
use of public funds to undergird the poor improves the case for steep progression.
III
It is time to turn the inquiry around. Is there
ground for believing that the case for steep
progression is weaker in the context of
financing a welfare program than in raising revenue for all other expenditures by government?
Several lines of thought merit exploration.
(1) Economic disincentives are likely to be
greater in the aggregate if taxes are levied to
finance redistribution of resources to the poor
as distinguished from other types of government programs. This observation is not to imply
that the purpose for which a given number of
dollars are taken from a taxpayer will have a
10

bearing on his economic conduct. The point,
more precisely, rests on the inevitability that any
broad-scale transfer of resources to the poor will
result in penalizing (or "taxing") the economic
activity of the recipients. Such a tax is not imposed by choice: rather, it will be embodied in
any feasible transfer program because, as the
un-subsidized income of one who qualifies for
support increases, the amount to be furnished
him by the government under the plan will decrease. Moreover, the penalty tax will affect
some who are above the legislatively defined
poverty line insofar as support payments are
made to them in ordcr to avoid imposing a prohibitively high negative tax on marginal income
as the dividing line is approached. This disincentive effect becomes more pronounced as the
poverty line is set at a higher level, largely because the penalty will be felt over a larger range
of incomes and by more persons. In any event
the total economic disincentive involved in a redistributional measure is composed of the negative impact of the actual levy on those taxpayers
who pay for the transfer of resources and the
negative impact of the "penalty tax" on those
who are the beneficiaries of the program. It is
this dual effect that suggests special caution in
relying on steeply progressive taxes to cover the
cost of resource transfers to the poor.
(2) Apart from the disincentive effect of any
feasible minimum support program, there may
well be another undesirable economic consequence to be considered in levying taxes on the
affluent to finance the transfer of resources.
The recipients of support are not likely to be
savers; indeed, the minimum income level
reasonably should be fixed on the assumption
that the beneficiaries will need to spend all their
income on goods and services. The non-poor of
course on balance do save. In general, however,
the affluent save proportionately more than the
middle class. These relationships suggest that a
massive redistribution of income from the
affluent to the poor will reduce the aggregate
amount of private saving in the economy. In
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adjusting to higher rates of tax, some of the
wealthy h'iely will respond by spending less; but
on the whole the affluent predictably will respond in part by saving less. While any large
scale redistribution from the non-poor to the
poor will tend to have an adverse impact on the
total of private saving, this effect is likely to be
intensified if the transfer is from the affluent to
the poor.
The importance of saving is well understood
and need not be elaborated again. One observation, however, is particularly pertinent in this
discussion. The capital base, over time, depends
upon the level of saving. Income in the
society-including the income of the poor-is
closely related to the size of that capital base.
A fall in private saving can in theory be offset
by a comparable increase in saving by government. There is good reason to be skeptical about
this prospect. Saving by government calls for a
budgetary surplus. Most of the pressures in
modern times, it should be obvious, push in the
direction of operating the public sector at a
deficit. The decline in the purchasing power of
the dollar bears forceful witness to this conclusion.
(3) An inherent ambiguity about the concept
of a minimum standard of living might inadvertently result in intensifying the bite of steep
progressive taxation. It is tempting to define the
minimum standard in terms of the existing
profile of income distribution; indeed, the recent proposal noted earlier calls for bringing
everyone up to half the existing median income.
If our society continues to develop economically, the median income and hence the proposed support level, will accordingly go higher.
It is probable that the total amount of support
payments will also rise if the support level is
defined with reference to median income or any
comparable standard. And if the support payments are to be covered by taxes on the affluent,
as urged in the proposal, the total tax taken
from that group will likewise move up.
In projecting the impact that such an increase
12

might have on the steepness of progression, account must also be taken of any increase in the
incomes of the affluent associated with improvement in economic conditions. But it seems
most unlikely that incomes at the top will rise
relatively more rapidly than payments required
under a transfer program in which the support
level is defined in comparative terms. There is
thus a strong probability that, in the course of
time, the disincentive and redistributional effects of the arrangement would tend automatically to expand as the productivity of the
economy improved.
(4) A program to provide minimum support
for the poor is almost certain to augment the
role of government in our society. One can conceive of an income support system that is designed to function more or less mechanically,
with payments being based upon factors of an
objective nature. In practice, however, the operation is apt to be of a different character. Even
if all benefits are in the form of cash
payments-a most unlikely arrangement-the
plan would require a great deal of administrative implementation. We know enough about
welfare measures to be confident that a large
bureaucracy goes along with the best of plans.
What, it might be asked, does this fact have to
do with financing welfare benefits through taxes
that are steeply progressive? From one viewpoint the relationship is close and important.
For those who are troubled that an enlargement
of the role and power of government might endanger the vitality of a libertarian or decentralized society, recourse to steep progression in
the welfare setting appears to pose a special
threat. Many private or quasi-public organizations outside of government depend
significantly on financial support from the
affluent. Steep progression will undermine that
support, unless the high rates of taxation continue to be powerfully offset by tax deductions
and credits for contributions. Loss of support
very likely will lead to a contraction or termination of these institutions; possibly it might lead
13

to a take-over of their functions by the government or to making them dependent on appropriations enacted and controlled through the
political process.
In short, a program to transfer resources
from the affluent to the poor can be expected to
both strengthen the power of government and
weaken the power of potential counterbalancing
or moderating forces in the society. The danger
is that a crossover point will be reached at which
the outside forces are unable to remain viable.
(5) A plan that taxes the affluent in order to
transfer resources to the poor may subtly serve
to alter the character of society by markedly
changing the accepted meaning of private
property. The nature of the justification which
is perceived to underlie the tax pattern might in
this respect turn out to have a significance that
transcends the pattern itself.
Until relatively recent times, almost all the accepted justifications for progression avoided
embracing redistribution of economic things;
and even the few commentators who supported
progression on redistributive grounds invariably stopped short of proposing that the government explicitly increase taxes on the affluent
in order to bestow more resources on the poor.
The earlier justifications were predicated on a
broad meaning of private property that was
strongly and generally held: a person is entitled
to his property but the government may take
from him an amount that is thought to be a fair
sharing of the cost of discharging public functions. Against that backdrop consider the proposition that the affluent are to be taxed as part
of a plan to raise the poor to a higher economic
level. This underpinning for progression can
readily be read in a broader manner--one that
would give a quite radically different meaning
to the notion of private property. The larger
message in essence seems to be that an individual is entitled to keep only that portion of his
resources which the government decides not to
take for redistributional purposes.
A shift of this kind is likely to have wide
14

ramifications. The very nature of the dialogue
concerning income and wealth can be expected
to change. As the legitimacy of property rights
and claims to income are subjected to repeated
questioning, the politics of envy will increase
and may well come to predominate.

IV
Discussions of progressive taxation are invariably impeded by the difficulty of specifying a
criterion for arriving at the appropriate degree
of progressivity. There is still considerable vitality to the old aphorism about being at sea without a rudder. When dealing with taxation to
cover provision for the poor, the aphorism becomes especially pertinent because the potential
governmental expenditures are so very openended in nature. For that reason there may well
be special attraction in a tax policy formulated
along the following line: Whatever the degree
of progression that is built into the structure of
taxes required to finance all other operations of
government, all revenues associated with transfer of resources to the poor are to be collected
through application of a degressive pattern of
rates. It perhaps may not be too visionary to
think that the entire welfare program will be
more soundly conceived and more deeply accepted if, in the voting to compel such transfers,
all taxpayers having income above the minimum
level are required to bear the burden in proportion to that income. By following this principle
there might well emerge a better formed
consensus-or a kind of super consensus
-regarding the proper composition of an overall program for support of the poor.
It is interesting to speculate on why the middle class, meaning everyone between the poor
and the affluent, has not embraced with enthusiasm the proposal to place very heavy taxes
on the affluent so as to fund a transfer of greater resources to the poor. Various explanations
might be offered: the middle class does not understand the proposal, or it has been misled by
the affluent and their spokesmen, or it is simply
15

apathetic. The most insightful explanation may
well be that the middle class, adhering to many
of the values traditionally associated with private property, is making its own realistic assessment of the situation. It may well perceive, however vaguely, that the plan is likely to make serious inroads upon a system that over the years
has greatly improved the conditions of life for
the class. Put bluntly, members of the middle
class may believe that their own self-interests
will be served better by a system which radiates
the assumption that individuals are entitled to
what they own rather than by a system which
radiates the assumption that individuals are entitled only to what the government decrees they
can keep.
Numerous commentators have elaborated on
the theme that there may be little correlation
between the income of an individual and the
value he contributes to society. Surely these observers are sound in highlighting the
deficiencies in the operation of the pricing process and limitations of the market mechanism.
They are likewise sound in noting that the marginal value of one person's input will depend on
the input of many others. They further are
sound in reminding us of the extent to which
incomes depend on luck, family conditions, inheritance, educational opportunities and a host
of other factors. These observations, however,
need to be placed in proper perspective. The
position that persons are "entitled" to what they
own is obviously a view about justice. Of equal
or perhaps greater significance, it is also a view
about organizing economic relationships among
persons. Material well-being or standing is to a
large degree perceived in terms of resources
available to the individual free and clear of
taxes. A dollar spent by government is not equivalent to a dollar that the taxpayer is free to
spend. Perhaps the entitlement principle of organization is not the best one imaginable. But
until a clearly better alternative is developed
and gains acceptability, actions that undermine
it deserve to be met with much skepticism.
16

V
There is no escaping the conclusion that a
pattern of steep progression at high levels of
taxation does not blend comfortably into a society that heavily relies on traditional notions of
private property and private initiative as energizing forces or tools. This tension emerges
most sharply when it is proposed to levy very
high taxes on the affluent in order to redistribute resources to the poor. Even if the relationship between taxation and benefit payment is
kept in an obscured state, the tension will
nevertheless be felt as economic incentives are
dampened and rights of ownership in property
come to be defined in more restrictive terms.
The case for steeply progressive taxation, particularly to finance the transfer of resources to
the poor, may seem easy if one shortsightedly
considers only the current end-state of the process that produced the prevailing distribution of
income and wealth in our society. But in the
not-too-long run the more essential qualities of
the society are determined by the processes and
institutions by which the distribution as of the
moment came about. For those who look
beyond the short run, the case for progressive
taxation is still likely to seem uneasy.

17

Editor: Susan C.Haddad
Assistant: Margaret M. Clark

OCCASIONAL PAPERS
FROM
THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
1111 EAST 60TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637
No. 1. "AComment on Separation of Power"
Philip B. Kurland, November 1, 1971.
No. 2. "The Shortage of Natural Gas"
Edmund W. Kitch, February 1, 1972.
No. 3. "The Prosaic Sources of Prison Violence"
Hans W. Mattick, March 15, 1972.
No. 4. "Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Law
Practice"
Stanley A. Kaplan, January 10, 1973.
No. 5. "Six Man Juries, Majority VerdictsWhat Difference Do They Make?"
Hans Zeisel, March 15, 1973.
No. 6. "On Emergency Powers of the President:
Every Inch a King?"
Gerhard Casper, May 31, 1973.
No. 7. "The Anatomy of Justice in Taxation"
Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr.,
October 1, 1973.
No. 8. "An Approach to Law"
Edward H. Levi, October 15, 1974.
No. 9. "The New Consumerism and the
Law School"
WalterJ. Blum, February 15, 1975.
No. 10. "Congress and the Courts"
Carl McGowan, April 17, 1975.
No. 11. "The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation in 1976"
WalterJ. Blum, November 19, 1976.

